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Caplin & Leahy (1996) show that, when central bankers learn about the
economy by observing its response to policy shock, cautious monetary policy
may be ine®ectual as private agents correctly anticipate that today's interest
rate cuts are likely to be followed by future cuts. The central banker has to
account for this strategic response of private agents to small interest rate cuts
by acting more aggressively than would otherwise be the case. Caplin & Leahy,
however, do not examine whether or not this strategic behavior on the part
of private agents represents a constraint on the ability of monetary policy to
implement optimal investment outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to show
that the kinds of strategic interactions between investors and the central banker
highlighted by Caplin and Leahy a®ect only the policy rule and do not in°uence
the investment outcome in equilibrium.
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Central bankers frequently respond to recessionary episodes by lowering interest
rates in hopes of inducing additional investment. Such a central bank has an incentive
to be cautious, however, as excessive stimulation may lead to a rise in in°ation. Caplin
& Leahy (1996) analyze the implications for expansionary monetary policy when central
bankers learn about the economy by observing its response to policy shocks. They show
that a cautious approach to monetary policy (i.e. starting with a small interest rate cut
and waiting to see what happens), may be ine®ectual because private agents correctly
anticipate that future rate cuts are likely to follow, and strategically delay investment
as a result.
The well known1 implication of this mechanism is that it changes the form of the
optimal interest rate rule. Interest rate cuts that do not take the strategic behavior
of private agents into account will be too conservative and lead to excessively long
recessions. As a result, when private agents behave strategically, the central banker
must act aggressively in the face of an economy operating below potential output.
Caplin & Leahy, however, do not discuss the implications of this mechanism for
the equilibrium investment pro¯le. This leads to possible confusion about whether
the equilibrium investment pro¯le implemented by the central banker is sub-optimal.2
In other words, does the strategic behavior of agents represent a constraint on the
ability of monetary policy to implement optimal outcomes or does it merely mandate
a modi¯cation of the optimal policy rule, with no e®ect on the ability of the central
banker to achieve desired outcomes?
This paper shows that strategic interactions between investors and the central
banker in this environment only a®ect the policy rule. The central banker is able
to achieves his or her desired outcome despite the strategic behavior of private agents.
This result is shown by studying a problem in which the central banker is able to
directly choose the decision rules of the agents. This eliminates the possibility of any
strategic interaction between investors and the central banker and sets up a benchmark
against which the equilibrium of the original model can be compared. The investment
pro¯le which solves this problem is identical to the investment pro¯le which obtains in
equilibrium in the original model.
Both the equilibrium and optimal investment pro¯les do exhibit delay, but this is
due to the inherent uncertainty in the economy and is not exacerbated by the strategic
interaction between the central banker and private agents. Furthermore, if the central
banker were to target the socially optimal level of investment, the equilibrium outcome
of the policy game would be identical to the ¯rst best outcome.
1See Wieland (2000), Yetman(2003), for example.
2See Spahn (2001), for example.
12 The Model
This paper re-visits Caplin & Leahy's model to examine whether or not the mech-
anism they identify a®ects the equilibrium investment pro¯le. Unlike in their model,
where the central banker can only in°uence private agents via interest rates, here the
central banker is allowed to directly choose the decision rules of the agents. This elim-
inates the possibility of any strategic interaction between investors and the central
banker and sets up a benchmark against which the equilibrium of the original model
can be compared. The modi¯ed model is identical to Caplin & Leahy's original en-
vironment, aside from the ability of the central banker to set private agents' decision
rules.
Time is discrete, and t = 1;2;:::;1. At any point in time the economy is in one of
three states: a recessionary state, an in°ationary state, and a state of full employment
and stable prices. The economy begins in the recessionary state. Following Caplin &
Leahy, both the full employment and the in°ationary state are assumed to be absorbing
(i.e. the game ends once the economy enters either of these states).
The central banker has preferences over the three states of the economy as follows:
for each period in which the economy remains in recession the central banker receives
a payo® of ¡®, upon entering the in°ationary state the central banker receives a payo®
of ¡¯, and the central banker su®ers no dis-utility in the full employment state. The
central banker discounts the future at rate ½. Since only the relative value of ® and ¯
matter, ¯ is normalized to 1.
There are two potential investment projects, indexed i 2 f1;2g. If neither project is
undertaken, the economy is said to be in the recessionary state, if both are undertaken
the economy enters the in°ationary state, and if one is undertaken the economy reaches
full employment with stable prices.
Each project belongs to a private agent and is characterized by a parameter ¼i,
which re°ects the pro¯tability of the agent's investment project. Higher ¼ corresponds
to more pro¯table investment. Each ¼i is independently drawn from a uniform distri-
bution on [0,1]. The distribution is known to all players but the realization of each ¼i
is known only to player i. A project can only be undertaken once.3
The central banker chooses the investment strategies, which are decision rules spec-
ifying whether an agent with a given ¼i invests or not at any date t, subject to the
informational constraints of the original model (that the central banker does not ob-
served the realized values of pro¯tability). Thus, the central banker is restricted to
specifying a set of values of pro¯tability at each time t, denoted ¦t, such that project
i is activated at time t if and only if ¼i 2 ¦t. Furthermore, the central banker is
3In the original model, agents choose the timing of investment to maximize expected pro¯ts. An
agent investing in period t the agent receives a payo® of ±t ¢ (¼i ¡ rt), where ± is the agents discount
factor and rt 2 [0;1] is the interest rate, which is the policy instrument the central banker uses to
in°uence the investment decisions of private investors. If an agent chooses not to invest then the agent
receives a payo® of zero in that period but retains the option to invest at some future date.
2constrained such that the highest pro¯tability projects are the ¯rst to be activate. In
other words, ¦t takes the form [¼t¡1;¼t], where ¼t ¸ ¼t¡1 and ¼0 = 1.4
Let vt(¼) denote the value of the optimal policy for the central banker given that it













If the \game" continues the central banker faces the same trade-o® between in°ation
and unemployment for every ¼. Hence, vt(¼) is constant and equal to v for all t,
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This is the same investment pro¯le as occurs when the central banker does not
choose the cuto®s directly (i.e. it is identical to equation (1) in Caplin & Leahy).
This shows that strategic interactions between private agents and the central banker
do not a®ect the pro¯le of investment. The central banker is able to implement his/her
preferred outcome as an equilibrium outcome.
An alternate way of making the same point is to ask what would happen if the
central banker's objective were to maximize the welfare of agents in the economy,
which in this case would mean maximizing discounted expected pro¯ts. It is easy to
see that the ¯rst best is for both agents to invest in the ¯rst period. This is because
pro¯ts are always positive and agents discounts the future.
What would the equilibrium outcome be in the case where the central banker tar-
geted the ¯rst best outcome but could only in°uence investment by changing the in-
terest rate? In this case, it turns out that the central banker is able to implement the
¯rst best as an equilibrium outcome in this case. This is achieved by setting r1 = 0.
Since 0 is the lowest value the interest rate can take, private agents have no incentive
to delay in hopes of lower future interest rates. Furthermore, when the interest rate is
zero, all projects are pro¯table, since ¼i ¸ 0. Therefore, both agents invest in the ¯rst
period.
4Since the central banker doesn't care about pro¯tability relaxing this assumption would allow for
multiple optima (of which, the optimum solved for here would be one). Essentially, given the central
banker's preferences, only the probability of investment matters. The central banker is indi®erent
between investment pro¯les where pro¯ts are high versus those where pro¯ts are low, as long as the
probability of investment at each t is identical under each pro¯le. This assumption amounts to forcing
the central banker to choose the most pro¯table of all investment pro¯les which maximize his/her
payo®s.
33 Remarks
This paper shows that strategic interactions between investors and the central
banker in this environment only a®ect the policy rule. The central banker is able
to achieves his or her desired outcome despite the strategic behavior of private agents.
There is delay in investment in equilibrium, but this is the optimal response to the
uncertainty inherent in the economy and is una®ected by any strategic behavior on the
part of investors.
Caplin and Leahy are motivated by the \apparent failure of monetary policy to end
the recent recession in the United States in spite of a reduction in the discount rate of
400 basis points." In light of the results of this paper, however, it is unclear that one
should interpret the observation that central bankers made successive cuts in interest
rates and did not end rapidly as a failure of monetary policy. A policy maker with the
preferences speci¯ed by Caplin and Leahy attempting to implement the optimal policy
would follow just such a strategy, and would have successfully implemented his or her
preferred outcome. This outcome would involve a delayed recovery from the recession,
but this delay would represent the policy maker's optimal response to the uncertainty
inherent in the economy rather than a failure of monetary policy.
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